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Abstract 
 We know that our thinking is affected by conflict; this applies to groups and nations as much as to 
individuals. Mediators are at the sharp end of this phenomenon, and those we work with often find each 
other’s behaviour at best inexplicable and at worst malicious. This article considers how biases and 
heuristics (mental shortcuts) can exacerbate disputes. Two cognitive biases in particular can contribute to 
the growth of conflict: the fundamental attribution error and the self-serving bias.  Using a workplace 
mediation case study, the article traces the step-by-step mechanics of conflict in people’s thinking and its 
tendency to set in motion vicious circles of suspicion and defence. It goes on to provide a critique of 
bullying and harassment policies before proposing that they begin with a mediation stage in order to combat 
attribution errors by bringing more data into play. 
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Introduction 
“No man can think clearly when his fists are clenched” (George Jean Nathan). 
 Conflict is a puzzle. Friedrich Glasl’s vivid language captures its steady descent from “hardening” all 
the way to “together into the abyss” (Glasl, 2000). We all know about its destructive power: many millions died 
in the great wars of the 20th century, and yet it can be tempting to conceive of others in conflict as silly. 
Why do people make such self-destructive choices? Think of the couple recently referred to mediation in 
Ireland who had apparently appeared in court over seventy times (Walsh, 2013). Each individual step must 
have seemed logical to the participants, yet the overall result defies rationality. 
 All of this highlights the crucial importance of perception. Our actions rely on fine judgements 
about the actions and intentions of others: a great deal is at stake. Too trusting, and we risk failing to defend 
ourselves against a malign foe. Not trusting enough, and we have no allies and even turn friends into foes. 
Starting with a case study from the world of workplace conflict, I describe some of the biases that affect 
our perception and their implications for conflict resolution. 
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Margaret and Colin 
 Margaret and Colin are senior professionals in a busy healthcare organisation. They are both in 
their mid-40’s. Colin was appointed to the management team 18 months ago, meaning that Margaret and 
five others now report directly to him. 
 Margaret and Colin work on separate sites. Before Colin was appointed to the Management Team 
they got on reasonably well as colleagues, occasionally visiting each other’s sites but having little day-to-day 
contact. After Colin’s appointment, things deteriorated sharply. Margaret has accused Colin of bullying her. 
She initially complained to the General Manager and, when he took no action, became ill with stress. She 
also raised a formal grievance against Colin, citing bullying and harassment. By the time this matter came 
to mediation Margaret had been off sick for a year. The terms of her contract mean that she continued to 
receive her substantial salary for the first twelve months of absence, and will receive 50% for the following 
twelve months. In the meantime, the organisation has had to employ a temporary person to cover 
Margaret’s work at a cost of approximately 
£150,000 per annum (more than her salary). 
 Margaret says that Colin’s bullying is particularly severe, and she has turned to the Employers’ 
Guidance on Bullying and Harassment (NHS, 2006) to help her categorise the behaviour. She cites the 
following as examples:  
Bullying by aggressive and intimidating behaviour – angry, aggressive tone, viciously spitting out words, scarlet 
face, raised voice, almost ‘losing it’ 
Bullying by intimidation/isolation – scheduling staff interviews for the only day when Margaret would not be 
accompanied by a colleague; showing anger when Margaret refused to agree to a change of plan during the 
interview 
Bullying by abuse of power/ignoring – when Margaret asked for help with a rota, shrugging his shoulders and 
saying ‘someone has to do it’ 
Harassment – calling Margaret and colleague ‘you girls’ 
Bullying by abuse of power/exclusion – discussing a plan for a change in service delivery that would have a 
significant impact on Margaret without consulting her 
Bullying by setting unrealistic targets that are unreasonable – a public statement, the consequences of which 
could only mean more work for Margaret 
Bullying by deliberate withholding of information   – not providing an agenda for a forthcoming meeting 
Bullying by humiliation/undermining/unfair criticism – disbelieving her account of a complaint by another 
healthcare professional that she had kept him waiting for two hours 
 This helpful list allows Margaret to describe eight pages’ worth of humiliation, belittlement and 
daily anguish. It is little surprise, then, that her performance and health have suffered. 
Having heard such a catalogue of accusations, we are no doubt curious to learn whether they were upheld 
(telling us that Colin is an angry, toxic, bully), or not (telling us that Margaret is delusional, manipulative or 
both).   Being a typical mediator, however, I will explain why neither is true. Drawing on simple, well 
supported ideas from the field of social cognition, I suggest that this case, and many others like it, illustrate 
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three phenomena: 
1) The vulnerability of Western people to errors of attribution and cognition 
2) The part these errors play in the growth of conflict, creating ‘vicious circles’ 
3) That bullying and harassment policies can exacerbate the very problems they exist to tackle, acting as a form 
of self-fulfilling prophecy. 
 
Cognitive Errors 
 We all need to make daily judgements about the people around us. Are they being friendly or bitchy, 
honest or deceitful, trustworthy or sly, generous or self-aggrandising? Social psychologists call these 
judgements “attributions” (Heider, 1956) and we are generally pretty good at making them: hardly surprising 
when our survival could depend on their accuracy. If a stranger approach me on a dark night, I probably 
use all my powers of observation and experience to work out whether to cross the street or stride on 
confidently. 
 However, many social situations are ambiguous. If a colleague makes a funny remark about my 
appearance, is she affectionately teasing or subtly undermining? If I am late with a piece of work, does my 
boss see me juggling equally important priorities, or just the missed deadline? If she gives me extra work, is 
it compliment or punishment? The answers to these questions can depend less on the evidence than on our 
thinking: “We do not see the world as it is. We see the world as we are” (Anais Nin). 
 To understand attribution theory and its explanation for errors in our thinking, we first need to 
distinguish between ‘internal’ and ‘external attributions. Suppose a senior colleague is tapping on his iPhone 
while I am speaking in a meeting. I can’t see inside his head, but I need to explain this potentially 
undermining behaviour, particularly if my social status is at stake (Fesenmaier, 2012). I might guess that he 
is self-important: his affairs matter more than the rest of us. This would be an internal attribution. I account 
for his behaviour by factors internal to him: it’s the way he is. Internal (or dispositional) attributions are 
stable and predictable and thus help us to plan. I will be wary of this guy in future. 
 On the other hand, (particularly if he has a reputation as a warm, decent person) I might guess that 
he is dealing with some particularly worrying concern. He may just have discovered, for example, that his 
child is ill and needs to be collected from school. This would be an external attribution. I attribute his 
behaviour to this fleeting circumstance, meaning that I should attach little importance to it in my long-term 
judgement of him. External (or situational) attributions are unstable: they don’t help me predict how he will 
behave in future, different, situations. 
 Making internal and external attributions is daily fare and we get it right most of the time. However, 
one bias in our judgement is so frequent that it has been dubbed the “fundamental attribution error” 
(Pennington, 2000:38- 43). It describes the tendency, when explaining the behaviour of others, to 
overestimate the role of internal factors and underestimate the part that external factors play; “to assume that 
an actor's behavior and mental state correspond to a degree that is logically unwarranted by the situation” (Andrews, 
2001:11). Put simply, we habitually make internal attributions when we ought to be making external 
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attributions. 
 Psychologists have posited three possible explanations for the phenomenon: 
1) The other person’s behaviour “engulfs our perceptual field” (Heider, cited in Pennington, 2000:40). When we 
observe someone in a scene, it is natural to see the person first rather than their situation. It requires further 
attention to notice the surrounding circumstances. 
2) We construct the world in two stages, spontaneously then deliberatively. Our first impression can be 
corrected by further attention, given time. 
3) Cognitive load. It seems that we are more prone to the fundamental attribution error when we are “cognitively 
busy” (Pennington, 2000:41; Tierney, 2011). People who were distracted by other tasks were less likely to 
correct dispositional attributions, even when situational information was readily available. 
 In summary, when we are under stress or simply not paying full attention, we are more prone to 
the fundamental attribution error. Going back to my inattentive colleague, “he’s a bad guy” rather than 
“he’s having a bad day”.  
 But that’s not the whole story.  What about ourselves?  People have marked tendency to view their 
own behaviour differently, in what are known as “actor-observer differences” (Pennington, 2000:43-45; 
Parkinson, 2008:59). In general, we are more likely to make external, or situational, attributions about our 
own behaviour, while preferring internal, dispositional, attributions for the behaviour of others.  So if I am 
the one stealing a glance at my phone while someone else speaks, I will explain this poor behaviour with 
reference to the looming family crisis, or the person who desperately needs to get hold of me. I am less 
likely to conclude that I am rude or arrogant (if I notice my own disposition I am likely to describe it 
charitably as an inability to multitask!) 
 A related phenomenon depends on the consequences of our actions. When things have gone well 
we are likely to attribute our success to internal or dispositional factors: “I did well in that exam because I 
worked hard and have an aptitude for the subject.” Conversely, poor outcomes garner external, situational 
attributions: “The teacher is a notoriously tough marker and I have a heavy workload this semester.” This 
is known as the “self- serving bias”: “the tendency to take credit for success and deny responsibility for failure” (Fiske & 
Taylor, cited in Pennington, 2000:49; Parkinson, 2008:61). It also has a mirror image, the “accuser bias”: “We 
readily bring to mind factors within the person’s control that might explain his or her behaviour, and tend to ignore or dismiss 
factors beyond his or her control that might explain the behaviour” (Allred, 2005:85). 
 The self-serving bias seems to go further, leading us to conclusions that favour our perspective 
even when the facts are ambiguous. One notable experiment involved legal students and practitioners being 
asked to predict a likely damages award based on identical facts (a motorcyclist colliding with a car and 
suing the driver for $100,000) (Babcock and Lowenstein, 1997). Unsurprisingly the range of predictions 
was large, but participants had been randomly assigned to two conditions: in one they acted for the plaintiff, 
the other for the defendant. Over a number of experiments, plaintiffs’ attorneys estimated a figure $14,000 
to $21,000 dollars higher than that of defendant lawyers. 
 The tendency to make dispositional attributions, including the fundamental attribution error, is less 
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pervasive in parts of Asia. Indian and Chinese people appear more likely to consider the situation or 
circumstances when apportioning responsibility for a harmful act. More individualist cultures like the UK 
and USA seem to favour dispositional explanations, perhaps because they chime with an emphasis on 
personal responsibility (Parkinson, 2008:58). 
 This picture is further enriched by a glance at the neuroscience of conflict.  Once aroused by threat 
or anger we are programmed to behave in ways that minimise the chances of rational, reflective thought 
and maximise instinctual, reflexive actions.  The limbic system with its repertoire of emotions protects us 
from immediate danger and increases our chances of survival in part by acting before the neocortex and 
other ‘higher’ parts of the brain kick in (Lack and Bogacz, 2011).  But in complex, nuanced environments 
like the contemporary workplace we can find ourselves charging down a road of instinctive fight and flight 
responses quite inappropriate for the problems we need to solve. 
 
The growth of conflict 
 So how might these patterns of thinking affect Margaret and Colin? Let’s take her first heading, 
“Bullying by Aggressive and Intimidating Behaviour.” At first sight, this is inexcusable. If Colin adopts an angry, 
aggressive tone and spits out his words, almost losing his temper, he must be an aggressive, angry person. 
Well, possibly. An outside observer may be able to offer alternative explanations: perhaps he is having a 
bad day; perhaps he is under pressure from those above him; perhaps he sees Margaret as thwarting his 
goals. But Margaret is not an outside observer: she is the one being harmed by Colin’s outburst. He “engulfs 
her perceptual field.” She feels threatened; she sees him; and the causal link is made. He is a bully. Crucially, 
she is unlikely to pay much attention to herself and any contribution she may have made to the situation. 
 Furthermore, all this happens very quickly.  Primal emotions like fear cause us to react in fractions 
of a second. So Margaret is likely to be making her attributions spontaneously rather than deliberatively, 
giving her less time to correct any errors. And she is undoubtedly under stress, rendering her “cognitively 
busy” and therefore less likely to look for external explanations for Colin’s behaviour. Add to this the 
likelihood that this was not the first difficult encounter between the two: Margaret’s memories of previous 
negative attributions about Colin (he is aggressive, threatening, nasty) almost certainly lead her to attribute 
his actions to his disposition rather than the situation. 
The actor-observer difference may also come into play. Colin shouted at her (external): all she could do was 
defend herself. In her view Colin’s behaviour, on the other hand, stems from his aggressive and 
unreasonable nature (internal). Colin, however, might have brought his own dispositional attributions into 
the room, recalling that Margaret had a record of challenging management decisions. 
 There is every chance that the third related phenomenon, the “self-serving bias” is also at work. 
Margaret’s situational account of her own actions renders them reasonable or even unavoidable. On the 
other hand, the “accuser bias” means that Margaret will be conscious of how much control Colin should have 
over the situation and will probably dismiss “factors beyond his control”, i.e. her own approach. Therefore, no 
excuse can be made and he should be condemned for his behaviour. 
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 This takes us to the heart of the vicious circles that pervade workplace conflict. In the social world, 
anyone we observe is also observing us. If we bring our own fears, hostility or anxiety to an encounter, it is 
unlikely that the other person will miss it. As Lax and Sebenius (2006:81) put it “If you’re seated at the negotiating 
table in the absolute, unshakable conviction that your counterpart is a stubborn and difficult character, you are likely to act in 
ways that will trigger and worsen those very behaviours.” In a kind of self-fulfilling way, if I expect trouble I may 
well get it.  I take defensive action: you see me as aggressive.  I take avoiding action: I’m rude.  I seek 
support from others: I’m plotting against you.  What emerges forcefully is this: at the very times when we 
most need to be discerning about others, we are least likely to be. We do not accurately interpret motives 
from actions. 
 
Why Bullying and Harassment Policies Make Things Worse 
 One important clarification: I am not saying that bullying is always a matter of perception. People 
can be unkind, disrespectful, even contemptuous, and act in ways that harm and humiliate others. A great 
deal of behaviour is, however, ambiguous and, as we have seen, human judgement is fallible and prone to 
bias. The most significant step in resolving many situations is to enrich that judgement, taking account of 
unseen situational factors affecting the other person and incorporating unacknowledged internal factors in 
our view of ourselves. This requires conversation.  It is slow, painstaking work. 
 Bullying and harassment processes do the opposite. In a well-intentioned effort to protect the 
vulnerable they freeze everyone’s perspectives at their lowest ebb. Taking the accuser’s story as a ‘true’ 
starting point, the accused is immediately labelled a bully, required to defend her or himself and sometimes 
even marched off the premises. The accuser gets no explanation, no insight into the sources or causes of 
conflict, nor of the situational factors (including her own actions) affecting the behaviour and her 
perception of it.  And once behaviour is framed by the accusatorial process, any attempt to explain will be 
seen as an excuse, a convenient, retrospective way to wriggle out of responsibility. 
 Margaret’s case also illustrates the power of labels. Bullying and harassment policies invite the 
accuser to rehearse their victimhood, via terms like isolation, exclusion, intimidation, and abuse of power. 
All of these reinforce attribution errors, reducing to zero any external explanatory factors and leaving open 
only two equally unpalatable internal explanations: bad or mad. And once we are dealing with a malign or 
crazy foe we can no longer treat that individual like a fellow human being; our only options are to drive the 
threat away or flee ourselves. 
 Reality is messier. A bullying allegation is investigated. The behaviour complained of is ambiguous, 
the evidence inconclusive or the explanation plausible. The complaint is not upheld. The victim then refuses 
to return to work. Nothing in the process has enriched her or his understanding of the other person’s 
perspective; equally the accused has learned little or nothing of the accuser’s perspective, probably regarding 
the allegations as ‘lies’. The process produces neither change nor the incentive to change. 
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Conclusion: What’s the Tonic? 
 At the risk of falling victim to Mandy Rice-Davies’s wise quip – “Well he would, wouldn’t he?” – I will 
suggest that consensual processes like mediation ought to be attempted first before formal, adversarial 
investigation. This is not because they are nice! Mediation is far from nice, and those who are asked to 
consider it often display considerable anxiety at the thought of dialogue with the ‘adversary’. 
 It is rather because these processes allow more data to emerge. By removing the need to maintain 
a legally watertight position, a reasonably competent mediator can help people to enrich their 
understanding, adding situational and dispositional factors to each side’s perspective. And if I begin to 
understand how my behaviour affects you, not only can I explain it, I can in the right circumstances 
apologise for it and explain how I will modify it in future. This does not mean that bullying is not being 
taken seriously. On the contrary, the mediator honours each person’s account of the situation. One 
mediation quality that is frequently overlooked is its capacity to help us hear our own thoughts more clearly. 
 To return to Margaret and Colin, their path was not particularly straightforward. It took four 
meetings over a couple of months to allow Margaret to work things through with Colin and contemplate a 
return to work. 
 However, what is striking is that, before she did, she and Colin wrote a joint letter to senior 
management setting out some shared concerns and explaining that they were now able to work together. 
Colin had gone from being ‘enemy’ to ‘ally.’ 
 I finish with a striking example.  Another client spoke of being physically sick on the way to work 
each day because of her colleagues’ concerted campaign of bullying.  Their bullying behaviour included 
talking and laughing when she walked into the room before falling silent.  She dreaded each day at work 
and was on the brink of leaving. Following a difficult and painstaking mediation, which included a great 
deal of soul-searching on both sides, we held a review session some months later.  Describing how things 
had changed she said this: “Before when I heard them laughing I assumed they were laughing at me. Now 
I tell myself that they’re just laughing.” 
 What had happened? In the mediation she had laid out exactly how the behaviour affected her. 
Thus the story was enriched for both parties, with the accused ‘ringleader’ learning how their actions caused 
distress, but with the accuser also learning about possible situational or innocent explanations for those 
actions. Over the ensuing weeks, the resultant change in atmosphere had reduced her anxiety levels, and 
thus her cognitive load, giving her time to re-evaluate her spontaneous judgements about the causes of the 
team’s actions.  This led her to feel more confident and to believe that she was a respected member of the 
team. And so the vicious circle of bullying and isolation had been reversed, with cooperation and trust 
gradually rebuilding with each positive step. To reiterate, while investigation and punishment remain 
important tools for egregious and discriminatory bullying, employers would do well do begin with a step 
that includes dialogue and brings neglected data into play. 
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